







A Survey on the Provision of Public Goods, International Public Goods, and 
Collective Action　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　Collective actions and transnational cooperation are crucial in a globalized world. 
For secure cross-border activities, the global community requires international 
security, development, and economic stability; humanitarian assistance; natural 
environments; and knowledge, which are termed “international public goods.” 
　We begin the analysis of international public goods provision by applying some 
implications from the accumulated arguments on domestic public goods. It is well 
known that two properties, non-rivalry and non-excludability in consuming, cause “the 
free rider problem,” which leads to the undersupply of public goods in pursuit of 
individual self-interest. According to the conventional theory of public goods, 
compulsions by governments（i.e., a non-market mechanism）ensure socially optimal 
supply of these goods.
　Even when cross-border transactions and flows continue to increase, establishing a 
world government would not be an easy task. Assuming the anarchic nature of the 
international community, international public goods must be voluntarily and 
collectively provided. This also means that the difficulty related to the provision of 
international public goods is highly related to one of the central theoretical problems 
of public goods, the “free rider problem,” and to the impossibility of collective action.
　As part of an investigation into the possibility of collective action or voluntary 
provision of international public goods, the purpose of this paper is to survey the major 
discussions on domestic public goods, international public goods, and collective action. 
By reconsidering the concept of public goods, we will find some clues toward designing 








































































































































崩れることになる（Musgrave, 1959, 邦訳 I，p.117）。こうなればLindahl
やBowenが想定した，公共財の需要量に対する真の情報を集められないで
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